The Covenant Universalist: May 2025

Thursday, May 29, 2025

Realism and Nominalism in Epistemology: Two Distinct Philosophical Approaches

Realism and Nominalism in Epistemology: A Philosophical Analysis

The history of epistemology is deeply intertwined with the metaphysical debates surrounding universals, classification, and the nature of knowledge. Among the most enduring of these disputes is the contrast between realism and nominalism, two fundamental positions that offer divergent accounts of how humans come to know and categorize the world. Though these terms are rooted in medieval metaphysics, their implications reach into contemporary epistemology, shaping debates in philosophy of language, science, and logic. This essay seeks to clarify the distinction between realist and nominalist epistemologies, tracing their philosophical lineage, defining their core commitments, and assessing their respective strengths and weaknesses.

I. Historical Context and Conceptual Foundations

The realist-nominalist debate dates back to ancient and medieval philosophy, particularly to Plato, Aristotle, and their medieval successors. In its classical form, realism—especially in the Platonic and later scholastic sense—holds that universals or abstract entities such as "redness," "beauty," or "humanity" have an existence independent of particular instances and of human cognition (Loux 2006, 3–6). In contrast, nominalism, such as William of Ockham, Berkeley and Hume, advocated, denies the independent existence of such universals, asserting that only particular objects exist and that universals are merely names (nomina) or linguistic constructs used to group similar things (Armstrong 1978, 5–10).

In epistemology, this metaphysical divergence leads to distinct conceptions of what it means to know something.

I.85.1). For the nominalist, knowledge is not about discovering pre-existing universals but about the application of labels, conventions, or conceptual schemes that help organize perceptual and empirical data (Ockham [1323] 1999, I.51). For them, knowledge involves discovering universals that are instantiated in particular things, with the mind having a capacity to abstract and apprehend real features of the world (Aquinas [1273] 2006, This approach is that of the empirical school of epistemology.

II. Realist Epistemology

Epistemological realism posits that our cognitive faculties are capable of knowing the general essences or natures of universal truths that may be observed in individual things. In this tradition, influenced heavily by Platonic thought, the mind is connected with universal conceptual forms such as beauty and love from which all particular instances may be deduced. Those who hold to this approach are called rationalists.

The ontological realism that underpins this view holds that universals exist in a transcendent realm (Platonic realism) (Loux 2006, 20–25). It is a top down, deductive approach. Consequently, knowledge is grounded in a correspondence between the mind and reality: concepts are true insofar as they reflect real features of the world (Freddoso 1988, 76–78).

In epistemological terms, realism is often allied with a foundationalist structure of knowledge, where basic concepts grounded in reality provide a secure basis for further inference. Moreover, it implies that learning and understanding involve discovery—an uncovering of structures that are "already there" in the world.

III. Nominalist Epistemology

Nominalism, by contrast, regards universals as mental or linguistic constructs with no real existence outside the mind. On this view, when we use a term like tree, we are not referring to a shared essence but to a loosely defined set of similarities among particular things (Ockham [1323] 1999, I.44–51). The concept tree is a convenient label for organizing our experiences and communicating about them, but it does not denote a metaphysical universal.

Aristotle, and Aquinas after him, believed that the mind abstracts universal concepts from sense experience. It is an bottom up, inductive approach. For example, upon encountering multiple individual trees, the mind abstracts the concept tree, which corresponds to a real essence shared by all trees (Aquinas [1273] 2006, I.85.2).

This approach leads to a more empiricist and sometimes constructivist theory of knowledge. According to William of Ockham, one of the most influential medieval nominalists, only individuals exist, and universals are mere flatus vocis—breaths of speech. Knowledge, then, is about forming useful categories that help us navigate the world, not about grasping eternal truths (Spade 1994, 154–156).

In modern philosophy, nominalism finds expression in the works of thinkers like Thomas Hobbes and David Hume, who emphasized the role of custom, habit, and association in the formation of knowledge (Hume [1739] 2000, 1.1.6–1.2.6). In the twentieth century, it aligns with certain strains of logical positivism and linguistic philosophy, which treat scientific theories and classifications as instrumental rather than representational (Carnap 1950, 3–5). Thus, epistemological nominalism tends to be anti-essentialist, context-sensitive, and pragmatically oriented.

IV. Points of Divergence

The differences between realist and nominalist epistemologies manifest in several key areas:

Ontology of Concepts: Realists affirm the non-material existence of universal concepts, while nominalists deny any such ontological status.
Nature of Knowledge: For realists, knowledge is a matter of discovering and understanding real essences and deducing truth from them; for nominalists, it is a matter of inductive reasoning, constructing and applying useful terms.
Justification and Truth: Realists ground justification in correspondence to real natures; nominalists ground it in coherence, utility, or consensus.
Role of Language: Realism often views language as a medium that reveals reality; nominalism sees it as a human-made system for managing experience.
Implications for Science and Metaphysics: Realism supports essentialist and explanatory frameworks; nominalism favors operational, descriptive, and sometimes anti-metaphysical approaches.

V. Contemporary Relevance

Though the metaphysical form of the debate has been partially sidelined in analytic philosophy, its epistemological implications persist. In the philosophy of science, scientific realism maintains that theoretical entities (e.g., electrons, genes) refer to real aspects of the world, whereas instrumentalists (often influenced by nominalism) treat such entities as useful fictions (Putnam 1975, 73–91). In cognitive science, debates about whether mental categories reflect real kinds or are culturally and linguistically constructed mirror the classical tension between realism and nominalism (Murphy 2002, 17–23).

Moreover, questions in AI, machine learning, and taxonomy continue to draw on these paradigms. Do neural networks discover real patterns in data, or do they simply generate useful heuristics? Is human categorization grounded in natural kinds or shaped entirely by social context? The realist-nominalist debate remains a fertile ground for addressing such foundational questions.

Conclusion

The distinction between realism and nominalism in epistemology is not merely a historical curiosity but a living debate with profound implications for how we understand knowledge, truth, and meaning. Realists offer a vision of a mind capable of accessing objective structures in reality, while nominalists emphasize the contingency, utility, and human-centered nature of classification. While each view has its strengths, their ongoing dialectic continues to shape philosophical inquiry into the nature and limits of human understanding.

Bibliography

Aquinas, Thomas. [1273] 2006. Summa Theologiae, translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Notre Dame: Christian Classics.
Armstrong, D. M. 1978. Universals and Scientific Realism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Carnap, Rudolf. 1950. The Logical Foundations of Probability. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Freddoso, Alfred J. 1988. “Introduction to the Treatise on the Divine Nature.” In On the Trinity, by St. Thomas Aquinas. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.
Hume, David. [1739] 2000. A Treatise of Human Nature. Edited by David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Loux, Michael J. 2006. Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction. 3rd ed. New York: Routledge.
Murphy, Gregory L. 2002. The Big Book of Concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Ockham, William of. [1323] 1999. Ordinatio (Scriptum in Librum Primum Sententiarum). Translated selections in Ockham’s Theory of Terms, edited by Michael J. Loux. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Putnam, Hilary. 1975. “What Is Realism?” In Meaning and the Moral Sciences, 69–90. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Spade, Paul Vincent. 1994. Five Texts on the Mediaeval Problem of Universals. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.

Wednesday, May 28, 2025

Gregory of Nyssa and the Doctrine of Hell: Nature, Purpose, and Duration

Introduction

Gregory of Nyssa (c. 335–c. 395), a Cappadocian Father and one of the most profound theologians of early Christianity, presents a vision of eschatological judgment that is distinctively shaped by his commitments to divine love, human freedom, and the final restoration of all creation. Unlike many of his contemporaries, Gregory advances a doctrine of hell (often described under the terms Gehenna or purifying fire) that is not eternal in duration, nor purely retributive in purpose. Rather, it serves as a pedagogical and purgative process leading ultimately to the healing and restoration (apokatastasis) of all rational beings (logikoi).

1. The Nature of Hell: Fire as Purification, Not Punishment

Gregory does not deny the reality of postmortem suffering, but he reframes it. In his writings, the language of “fire” and “punishment” is often symbolic, and its function is consistently therapeutic rather than retributive.

In his On the Soul and the Resurrection, written as a dialogue with his sister Macrina, Gregory writes:

“God’s fire is in no way evil, nor is it punishment by nature, but is good and beneficial; for it does not destroy but only consumes the evil.”
(De anima et resurrectione, PG 46.104)

The metaphor of fire is, in Gregory's thought, an image of divine love and truth exposing and burning away the dross of sin and ignorance. It is comparable to the “refiner’s fire” of Malachi 3:2–3, purifying the soul so that it may be conformed to God.

This conceptualization of fire aligns with his Platonic and Origenian inheritance: evil is not a substance but a privation of the good, and therefore it cannot endure eternally. The “torment” of hell is the soul’s experience of truth when still clinging to falsehood.

2. The Purpose of Hell: Restoration, Not Retribution

Gregory sees the divine economy as essentially restorative. God's justice is not vindictive but curative, always aiming at the healing of the soul. Thus, the purpose of eschatological suffering is pedagogical: to purge the soul and lead it back to God.

In The Great Catechism, Gregory is explicit about the teleological orientation of divine punishment:

“Being purified from evil, and having no further mixture of it in their composition, they may be restored again to the original grace.”
(Oratio Catechetica Magna, ch. 26; PG 45.93C)

He further argues that even the devil himself—though a deeply corrupted rational being—could, in theory, be restored, since God’s purpose is not the destruction of any being, but the transformation of all:

“The nature of evil, being without substance, will be wholly dissolved in the purification of all things, so that nothing contrary to the good shall remain.”
(Oratio Catechetica Magna, ch. 26)

This concept stands in tension with traditional Augustinian views of hell as the eternal domain of the damned, reinforcing instead the idea that punishment is medicinal—aimed at healing the soul of its diseases.

3. The Duration of Hell: Finite, Not Eternal

Gregory repeatedly suggests that any postmortem punishment is finite in duration. His theological anthropology presupposes that the rational soul, created in the image of God, is ultimately capable of repentance and transformation, even after death. Hell is therefore a process, not a fixed state.

In On the Soul and the Resurrection, he writes:

“The separation of the soul from evil must be accomplished, and this cannot be done without suffering... but the pain works to produce purification.”
(De anima, PG 46.92B–C)

He does not provide a numerical duration for hell but strongly implies that it will end when its work is done. Evil, having no ontological substance, cannot endure indefinitely. Once all beings have been purified, hell will cease to exist as a meaningful category.

4. Apokatastasis: The Consummation of All Things

Gregory’s vision of hell must be read within his broader eschatological framework of apokatastasis—the final restoration of all creation to communion with God. He is arguably the most systematic of the early church universalists, integrating this view into his cosmology, anthropology, and soteriology.

In his Homilies on 1 Corinthians 15, Gregory interprets Paul's statement that “God will be all in all” (1 Cor. 15:28) as the culmination of a universal process:

“When every nature has been restored to grace, and has returned to the original condition from which it fell, then God will truly be ‘all in all.’”
(In 1 Cor. 15, PG 44.1320C)

This restoration does not eliminate divine justice but perfects it by achieving the goal for which it exists: the healing of creation.

5. Modern Scholarship and Reception

Recent scholarship has highlighted Gregory's unique voice among the Fathers. Ilaria Ramelli argues that Gregory was "perhaps the most systematic universalist in the patristic era," whose theology of purification and restoration stands in continuity with Origen but develops it in new directions (Ramelli, The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis, 2013, pp. 407–423).

David Bentley Hart likewise affirms that Gregory’s eschatology “represents a profound refusal to accept that any final, unredeemed suffering could exist in a cosmos governed by infinite love” (That All Shall Be Saved, 2019, pp. 70–75).

However, it is worth noting that Gregory does not use the term apokatastasis with the technical precision of later writers, nor does he systematize the temporal mechanics of postmortem purification. Still, the thrust of his theology is unmistakably universalist in scope.

Conclusion

Gregory of Nyssa’s doctrine of hell is an outgrowth of his deeper commitments to divine goodness, human dignity, and cosmic restoration. For him, hell is a real but ultimately temporary process by which the soul is purged of sin and restored to God. It is neither eternal nor punitive in the Augustinian sense, but medicinal and teleological—a necessary stage in the soul’s ascent to its Creator.

In this vision, Gregory stands as a towering figure among early Christian universalists, offering a hopeful eschatology that refuses to separate justice from mercy, or judgment from love.

Works Cited

Gregory of Nyssa. On the Soul and the Resurrection. PG 46.
Gregory of Nyssa. The Great Catechism (Oratio Catechetica Magna). PG 45.
Gregory of Nyssa. Homilies on 1 Corinthians 15. PG 44.
Ramelli, Ilaria. The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis. Brill, 2013.
Hart, David Bentley. That All Shall Be Saved. Yale University Press, 2019.
Louth, Andrew. The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition. Oxford, 2007.
Daniélou, Jean. Platonisme et théologie mystique. Aubier, 1944.

Comparative Chart: Views of Hell in Early Universalist Theology

Theologian	Nature of Hell	Duration	Purpose	Key Source
James Relly	A spiritual condition of alienation and blindness; possibly postmortem.	Temporary – ends when the soul is healed and enlightened.	Corrective and purgative – part of the soul's awakening.	Union, pp. 137–139
John Murray	A temporal experience of judgment, often in this life; not a postmortem place.	Brief and proportional, not necessarily after death.	Restorative – to awaken the soul to divine love.	Letters and Sketches, Vol. 1
Elhanan Winchester	A real postmortem state of suffering, especially for the wicked.	Long-lasting but finite – may endure for “ages.”	Purifying – prepares the soul for final restoration.	The Universal Restoration

Summary of Key Differences

Aspect	Relly	Murray	Winchester
View of Judgment	Spiritual blindness or self-imposed suffering	Temporal discipline by a loving God	God’s justice administered after death
Emphasis on Afterlife	Minimal; focuses on present spiritual condition	Minimal; salvation is realized in this life	Strong focus on future eschatological events
Christ’s Role in Hell	Christ redeems and accompanies souls even in hell	Christ’s atonement prevents eternal punishment	Christ overcomes hell after an extended judgment

Universal Grace and Human Destiny in the Theology of John Murray

Universal Grace and Human Destiny: The Theology of John Murray in Comparative Perspective

Introduction

John Murray (1741–1815) is considered the theological and institutional founder of organized Christian Universalism in America. Deeply influenced by James Relly and later associated with fellow universalist preacher Elhanan Winchester, Murray articulated a vision of salvation in which the reconciling love of God would ultimately triumph over sin and death for all humanity. While Murray drew significantly from Relly’s Christological universalism, he developed his own emphases, especially in terms of ecclesiology and pastoral application. Moreover, his relationship with Winchester reveals important distinctions within early American Universalist theology, particularly regarding eschatology and scriptural interpretation.

I. John Murray’s Theology of Universal Salvation

Murray’s theology is grounded in three core affirmations:

The Universal Efficacy of Christ’s Atonement: Christ's redemptive work is not limited to the elect, but encompasses all people. Echoing Romans 5:18–19, Murray argued that "as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive" (1 Cor. 15:22).¹
The Sovereignty and Goodness of God: God's will to save is both loving and irresistible. Citing 1 Timothy 2:4 and John 12:32, Murray maintained that divine love was incompatible with the doctrine of eternal torment. God’s justice, he insisted, must always be interpreted through the lens of His mercy.²
Rejection of Eternal Damnation: While Murray acknowledged divine judgment, he interpreted it as restorative rather than retributive. Hell, for Murray, was a temporal condition of alienation and suffering intended to bring souls into a clearer understanding of divine truth.³

II. Murray and James Relly: From Disciple to Divergence

Murray’s theology was initially shaped by James Relly (1722–1778), a Welsh preacher whose radical Christocentric universalism deeply influenced him. Relly’s foundational claim was that Christ’s union with humanity was so comprehensive that all human beings participated in His redemptive act. This was a reversal of traditional federal theology: just as all were condemned in Adam, so too all were justified in Christ.

Relly's most influential work, Union, defends this theological claim by emphasizing the mystical and ontological connection between Christ and humanity. Salvation, in Relly’s view, was not contingent on individual faith or repentance but was objectively accomplished through Christ’s substitutionary identification with all people. In Union, he writes, "In all that Christ did, suffered, and obtained, the world was in Him, acted in Him, suffered in Him, and rose in Him."⁴

Relly’s understanding of hell is consistent with his overarching theology. In Union and other writings, he does not deny the existence of hell but interprets it as a present spiritual condition of alienation from God, as well as a temporary postmortem state that some may experience. Hell is seen not as a place of endless punishment, but as a necessary, though ultimately redemptive, aspect of divine judgment. He states:

"Hell is the portion of the wicked; but it is not endless. For the Redeemer has the keys of death and hell. His blood speaks better things. It cleanseth from all sin, and where sin is removed, there can be no more death or hell."⁵

Thus, for Relly, the duration of hell is finite, and its function is purgative rather than penal. This view greatly influenced Murray, who adopted a similar understanding but communicated it with more pastoral clarity and institutional vision.

Differences between Relly and Murray include:

Theological Tone: Relly’s writings are dense, mystical, and rhetorical, whereas Murray’s theology is accessible, emotionally engaging, and grounded in pastoral realities.⁶
Ecclesiology: Relly showed little interest in institutional religion or organized worship. Murray, however, founded churches and helped establish the Universalist Church in America.⁷
Scriptural Method: While both emphasized Pauline theology, Relly often relied on typological and symbolic readings. Murray preferred a more harmonized, devotional reading of Scripture.

III. Comparison with Elhanan Winchester

Elhanan Winchester (1751–1797), another major figure in early American Universalism, developed a more eschatologically complex vision of restoration than Murray. Though both preached the salvation of all souls, their differences are significant:

Issue	John Murray	Elhanan Winchester
View of Hell	Temporal and corrective	Real, purgative, and possibly of long duration
Duration of Punishment	Brief and proportionate	Possibly lasting "ages," but not eternal⁸
Use of Scripture	Pauline and pastoral	Broad and literalist, with strong emphasis on apocalyptic texts
View of Salvation	Completed in Christ	Gradual and eschatological
Moral Emphasis	God’s love produces holiness	Emphasized repentance and spiritual purification

Winchester’s major work, The Universal Restoration (1794), taught that while the wicked may endure future punishment, such suffering would be ultimately purifying and finite. He rejected annihilationism and eternal torment, but affirmed an age-long corrective hell prior to final reconciliation. Unlike Murray, who viewed salvation as already realized, Winchester believed in a cosmic unfolding of redemption across future "ages."

Winchester was also more open to apocalyptic and millenarian interpretations of Scripture, particularly the Book of Revelation. He anticipated a millennial reign of Christ before the ultimate restoration of all souls, including the devil and his angels.⁹

IV. Pastoral and Ecclesial Legacy

Murray's greatest legacy may lie not only in his theology but in his pastoral courage. In an era dominated by fear-based preaching, Murray’s proclamation of a loving and inclusive God gave hope to many who had been spiritually marginalized. He helped institutionalize Universalism in America, creating space for a community built on trust in the goodness of God and the dignity of every soul.

By contrast, Relly’s influence remained largely theological and literary. He never organized a formal denomination and preferred a more mystical presentation of truth. Winchester, while briefly influential in Philadelphia and London, never built a lasting institutional structure. Thus, Murray remains the pivotal bridge between radical universalist theology and ecclesial praxis.

Conclusion

John Murray stands as a central figure in the development of Christian Universalism. His thought, while rooted in the Christological union theology of James Relly, became more pastorally focused and institutionally grounded. Compared to Elhanan Winchester, Murray’s theology was more confident in the completed work of Christ and less speculative about the duration or stages of postmortem punishment. All three, however, shared a profound belief in the eventual restoration of all creation. In this sense, Murray’s enduring message—that “no soul shall be lost, for all belong to Christ”—continues to resonate as a declaration of divine hope.

Footnotes

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John Murray, Letters and Sketches of Sermons (Boston: Universalist Publishing House, 1812), vol. I, 47. ↩
Ibid., 98–100. ↩
Russell E. Miller, The Larger Hope: The First Century of the Universalist Church in America, 1770–1870 (Boston: Unitarian Universalist Association, 1979), 42–46. ↩
James Relly, Union: or, A Treatise of the Consanguinity and Affinity between Christ and His Church (London: J. Bunce, 1759), 41–42. ↩
Ibid., 138–139. ↩
George H. Williams, American Universalism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961), 71–75. ↩
Ernest Cassara, Universalism in America: A Documentary History of a Liberal Faith (Boston: Skinner House Books, 1971), 65. ↩
Elhanan Winchester, The Universal Restoration (Philadelphia: Thomas Dobson, 1794), 40–56. ↩
Ibid., 115–123. ↩

Saturday, May 24, 2025

Full Preterism and Universal Salvation: Eschatological Fulfillment and the Fate of the Unsaved Dead

Introduction

Full preterism, also known as consistent preterism, posits that all biblical prophecy, including the Second Coming, Resurrection, and Final Judgment, was fulfilled in the events surrounding the destruction of Jerusalem in AD 70. As a consequence, history continues indefinitely under the reign of Christ's spiritual kingdom. This framework departs from traditional futurist eschatology by eliminating a final cosmic consummation. This theological stance has profound implications for doctrines concerning the fate of the dead, particularly those who die outside of saving faith. If the world does not end and eschatological judgment is past, then the destiny of the unevangelized and the unsaved must be re-evaluated. This essay will explore how full preterist eschatology potentially reshapes and even supports various expressions of universal salvation, including forms proposed by James Relly and John Murray, Gregory of Nyssa and Elhanan Winchester and Origen and William Brennan.

I should add at the outset that although I am not convinced of this particular doctrine, I look at it as an alternate interpretation of the eschatological situation. It seems more in line with Origen's view which emphasizes free will than with my supralapsarian variation on it. My theonomic postmillenialism leads me to favor the idea that there will be a final consummation and a finite number of souls that are to be redeemed after which the earth will be no more.

I. Full Preterism: A Summary of Its Eschatological Claims

Full preterism interprets New Testament eschatology as being entirely fulfilled in the past. Its central claims include:

The Second Coming of Christ occurred in AD 70 in a non-physical, covenantal, and judicial manner.
The resurrection of the dead refers to the raising of the Old Covenant faithful into the New Covenant order.
The final judgment was executed upon Old Covenant Israel and her persecutors.

This framework sees no future global destruction or bodily resurrection, viewing such language as apocalyptic metaphor within a covenant-historical paradigm (Don K. Preston, Who Is This Babylon?, 2006). As Ed Stevens and Michael Sullivan argue, time continues indefinitely in a post-parousia world governed by Christ's spiritual reign (Final Decade Before the End, 2015; Armageddon Deception, 2011).

The result is an open-ended history in which human beings continue to be born, live, die, and enter the afterlife—without an eschatological terminus. This raises a significant theological problem: What becomes of those who die outside of explicit Christian faith in this ongoing, post-judgment world?

II. The Fate of the Unsaved in a Preterist Framework

Traditional Christian eschatology, both Augustinian and Reformed, envisions a final resurrection and judgment at the end of time, after which individuals are assigned to eternal reward or punishment. Full preterism, by contrast, holds that the “final” judgment has already occurred (Matt 24:34; Rev 22:12), and that individuals are judged at death, not at the end of time. This implies a form of realized personal eschatology.

Yet, within such a system, where history never ends, a troubling scenario emerges: countless generations are born post-AD 70 with no future "last chance" judgment. Those who die “unsaved” cannot be judged at a future final day—they must be judged at death. Does this entail eternal damnation for all who fail to embrace explicit gospel faith during life? This is where universalist theology enters the conversation.

III. Universalism in Patristic and Evangelical Thought

Gregory of Nyssa and Elhanan Winchester: Salvation Through Judgment

Gregory of Nyssa, the 4th-century Cappadocian Father, proposed a restorative view of divine judgment, wherein punishment purifies rather than eternally torments. In On the Soul and the Resurrection, he writes of divine fire that “removes the foreign matter” from the soul (Gregory, On the Soul and the Resurrection, §8). Elhanan Winchester, an 18th-century American preacher, taught similarly that the damned would eventually be purified and reconciled to God (Winchester, Dialogues on the Universal Restoration, 1788).

This view harmonizes well with preterism: since final judgment is past, and since the damned continue to exist in the afterlife, divine justice can still act beyond death, gradually restoring the wicked. The fire of judgment—fulfilled covenantally in AD 70—serves as a type for the spiritual fire of post-mortem purification.

The main caveat against this view is that it seems to downplay the significance of existence in the temporal realm. If all mankind were to die in their sins they could all be redeemed and removed from the purgatorial fires of divine judgement. This seems to make terrestrial existence rather meaningless, certainly less significant to ay the least.

John Relly and Rellian Inclusivism: Salvation Without Punishment

John Relly, an 18th-century theologian, developed a radical form of inclusivist universalism in which all are considered saved in Christ regardless of conscious faith, since the elect corporate humanity was unified in Him. This view, sometimes called Rellian Inclusivism, posits no post-mortem punishment, only immediate entrance into divine presence upon death. This view was brought to America by his disciple John Murry.

For full preterists who interpret hell (Gehenna) as a historical judgment on Jerusalem, Relly's view becomes attractive. Without a literal hell in the afterlife, and with judgment past, inclusivism seems to resolve the ethical tension of eternal damnation for finite sin. Don Preston and Michael Sullivan leave the door open to such interpretations, suggesting that "hell" is better seen as a temporal, covenantal consequence rather than a metaphysical place of torment (Armageddon Deception, p. 81).

But if the purgatorial view of Winchester downplayed the significance of terrestrial history and existence then the view of Relly does so with a vengeance. On his view there is absolutely no reason to preach he gospel since everyone goes to heaven immediately regardless of the life they lived on earth or their spiritual; state upon death, Of the three options this one seems the most flagrantly unbiblical as it ignores all the passages which call men to make a decision for Christ and to make disciples of the nations.

Origen and William Brennan: Salvation Through Reincarnation

Origen of Alexandria famously proposed a doctrine of apokatastasis, the final restoration of all souls—even Satan—through cycles of correction and rebirth (Origen, De Principiis, I.6.2–3). Similarly, modern universalist William Brennan has suggested that metempsychosis offers the soul repeated opportunities to come to God. This view can be expressed along Arminian lines as with Origen or along strong, even supralapsarian lines, as with Brennan.

Within a preterist cosmology, there is no eschatological deadline, allowing such views to flourish logically. A never-ending world provides limitless time for divine pedagogy, whether through multiple earthly lives or extended spiritual correction. Brennan argues: “Without a terminal eschaton, God can restore all things by love and truth alone, across ages of grace” (Brennan, Universal Restoration and Eternal Progress, 2008, p. 214).

IV. Evaluating the Ethical and Theological Implications

If history continues indefinitely and all prophecy is fulfilled, God’s universal saving purposes are not constrained by eschatological deadlines. This opens up possibilities for a more hopeful theological anthropology, in which even those who die unrepentant may eventually be reconciled to God. From this vantage point, post-mortem salvation is not a deviation from biblical teaching but a logical corollary of preterist eschatology.

However, such a stance requires a rethinking of mission, evangelism, and justice. If salvation is ultimately universal, does it negate the urgency of preaching? Not necessarily. As Gregory of Nyssa and Origen emphasize, judgment and discipline remain real—even if restorative. Evangelism, then, becomes a participation in God's healing work, not a rescue from eschatological destruction.

Conclusion

Full preterism, by declaring the end already fulfilled, forces theologians to reconsider the eternal fate of the unevangelized and unsaved. In a world with no eschatological terminus, universalist models offer compelling answers. Whether through restorative punishment (Gregory, Winchester), post-mortem reincarnation and repentance (Origen, Brennan), or immediate universal inclusion (Relly), the implications of full preterism seem to press toward the inevitability of universal salvation. While these views remain controversial within orthodox theology, they find in preterism an eschatological framework that allows them to flourish—and demand renewed theological reflection on God's justice, mercy, and ultimate purposes for humanity.

Bibliography

Brennan, William. Hope for the Lost (Toms River: Evangelical Universalist Press, 2011)
Gregory of Nyssa. On the Soul and the Resurrection. Translated by Catherine P. Roth. St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1993.
Origen. On First Principles (De Principiis). Translated by G.W. Butterworth. Harper and Row, 1966.
Preston, Don K. Who Is This Babylon? Ardmore, OK: JaDon Management, 2006.
Stevens, Ed. Final Decade Before the End: The Eight Years That Changed the World. Bradford, PA: International Preterist Association, 2015.
Sullivan, Michael J. Armageddon Deception. West Palm Beach: Tree of Life Ministries, 2011.
Winchester, Elhanan. Dialogues on the Universal Restoration. London, 1788.

The Judgment of the Nations: A Preterist Interpretation of the Parable of the Sheep and the Goats (Matthew 25:31–46)

Introduction

Among the parables contained in the Olivet Discourse, the Parable of the Sheep and the Goats (Matt 25:31–46) stands as one of the most vivid and eschatologically charged. Traditionally interpreted as a depiction of the final judgment at the end of the world, this passage is frequently cited as evidence of a universal and individual reckoning before Christ. However, preterist scholars challenge this assumption, asserting instead that the judgment depicted in this passage was a historical event involving nations, not individuals, and was fulfilled in the first-century judgment upon Israel and the Gentile world, climaxing in the destruction of Jerusalem in AD 70. This essay explores the preterist understanding of the parable, grounding it in the text’s context, its linguistic and thematic details, and the broader framework of covenantal judgment.

I. Contextual and Linguistic Foundations: "All the Nations"

The parable begins: "When the Son of Man comes in his glory, and all the angels with him, then he will sit on his glorious throne. Before him will be gathered all the nations (ta ethnē), and he will separate people one from another..." (Matt 25:31–32, ESV). The Greek term ethnē is critical to the preterist reading. While many interpret ethnē as individuals from all the nations, Milton S. Terry notes that ethnē consistently refers to collective bodies, political entities, or Gentile peoples in both biblical and classical usage (Terry, Biblical Apocalyptics, 1898, p. 231).

James Stuart Russell likewise emphasizes that the use of ethnē in the Gospels, particularly in eschatological contexts, should be understood as a reference to political nations or Gentile groups, especially in distinction from Israel. He argues: “There is no reason to depart from the ordinary signification of the word. It is the nations as such, the representatives of races and peoples, that are the objects of judgment” (Russell, The Parousia, 1878, p. 137).

This understanding shifts the referent of the judgment: it is not a final, individual judgment of all people, but a historical evaluation of how the Gentile nations responded to the gospel and to the “least of these,” Christ’s disciples, during the crisis period leading up to AD 70.

II. The Judgment as a First-Century Event

Preterists assert that the judgment described in this parable is not future to us but was future to Jesus’ audience and fulfilled in the first century. This reading is consistent with the larger Olivet Discourse, in which Jesus explicitly states: “Truly, I say to you, this generation will not pass away until all these things take place” (Matt 24:34).

Don K. Preston argues that the entire Olivet Discourse—including Matthew 25—is part of a unified prophetic narrative forecasting the end of the Jewish age, not the end of the physical universe. He writes, “There is not a break between chapters 24 and 25... The entire context is focused on the end of the Old Covenant world in AD 70” (Preston, Who Is This Babylon?, 2006, p. 111).

Michael J. Sullivan further develops this view by tying the “coming of the Son of Man in glory” to apocalyptic and symbolic language drawn from Daniel 7, where the Son of Man comes to the Ancient of Days, not to earth. This, Sullivan argues, reflects Christ's enthronement and judgment from heaven, which was visibly vindicated in the fall of Jerusalem (Sullivan, Armageddon Deception, 2011, pp. 65–70).

III. The Role of the "Least of These My Brothers"

A pivotal interpretive element in the parable is the identity of the “least of these my brothers” (Matt 25:40, 45). Rather than a general reference to the poor or suffering, preterists identify them specifically as Christ’s disciples—especially those sent out to proclaim the gospel during the period of apostolic mission and persecution. This interpretation finds strong support in Matthew 10:40–42 and Matthew 18:5, where Jesus uses similar language in reference to His representatives.

Ed Stevens observes that during the first-century missionary activity, nations were evaluated based on their treatment of the gospel messengers. The sheep represented those Gentile communities that received and supported the church’s emissaries, while the goats represent those who opposed or persecuted them. “This is not about general humanitarianism,” Stevens explains, “but about covenant loyalty and how nations responded to the messengers of the kingdom during the transition period” (Final Decade Before the End, 2015, p. 193).

IV. The Covenant and Theocratic Framework

Preterism views Matthew 25:31–46 within the larger redemptive-historical and covenantal drama between Israel and the nations. As the Old Covenant world was drawing to a close, Christ, as the enthroned Messianic King, was judging between the sheep and the goats—not as a final soteriological pronouncement, but as a covenantal reckoning upon how the nations responded to the gospel during the apostolic age.

Milton Terry connects this covenantal dimension with Old Testament prophetic oracles against the nations (e.g., Isaiah 13–23, Jeremiah 46–51), in which God judges collective entities based on their ethical or spiritual posture toward Israel or her mission. “The judgment of nations,” Terry writes, “was a common prophetic theme... it must be understood in the same light here” (Biblical Apocalyptics, p. 233).

V. Implications of a Temporal, National Judgment

Understanding this judgment as historical rather than eschatological reshapes its implications. The "eternal punishment" (Matt 25:46) and "eternal life" are best seen as qualitative rather than strictly temporal categories. Preterists like Don Preston argue that “eternal” (aiōnios) often refers to the age to come, not endless duration. Thus, the punishment and life refer to the covenantal blessings and curses accompanying the transition from the Old to the New Covenant era (Preston, Into All the World, Then Comes the End, 2009, pp. 88–90).

Michael Sullivan and Ed Stevens agree that this parable reflects a transition of ages, not a final cosmic judgment. Those nations that aligned with Christ and His people were incorporated into the blessings of the New Covenant, while those that resisted faced national collapse and covenantal exclusion.

Conclusion

The Parable of the Sheep and the Goats, far from depicting the final judgment at the end of world history, is better understood through the preterist lens as a first-century national judgment that took place within history. The ethnē refers to collective nations; the “least of these my brothers” refers to Christ’s emissaries; and the judgment reflects the outworking of covenantal blessings and curses during the transition from the Old to the New Covenant. Preterist interpreters such as James Stuart Russell, Milton Terry, Don Preston, Michael Sullivan, and Ed Stevens offer a compelling and biblically grounded framework for understanding this passage within the broader context of redemptive history and the fall of Jerusalem in AD 70.

Bibliography

Russell, James Stuart. The Parousia: A Critical Inquiry into the New Testament Doctrine of Our Lord’s Second Coming. London: Daldy, Isbister & Co., 1878.
Terry, Milton S. Biblical Apocalyptics: A Study of the Most Notable Revelations of God and of Christ. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1898.
Preston, Don K. Who Is This Babylon? Ardmore, OK: JaDon Management, 2006.
Preston, Don K. Into All the World, Then Comes the End. Ardmore, OK: JaDon Management, 2009.
Stevens, Ed. Final Decade Before the End: The Eight Years That Changed the World. Bradford, PA: International Preterist Association, 2015.
Sullivan, Michael J. Armageddon Deception. West Palm Beach: Tree of Life Ministries, 2011

The Olivet Discourse fulfilled in AD 70: A Preterist Interpretation of Matthew 24–25

Introduction

The Olivet Discourse, recorded in Matthew 24–25, is one of the most theologically and eschatologically significant passages in the New Testament. Delivered by Jesus shortly before His crucifixion, this discourse responds to the disciples’ question concerning the timing and signs of Jerusalem’s destruction and “the end of the age” (Matt 24:3). While futurist and dispensationalist interpretations dominate much of modern evangelical theology, a robust and ancient tradition of interpretation—preterism—holds that the entirety of the Olivet Discourse was fulfilled in the events surrounding the fall of Jerusalem in AD 70. This essay will argue for the preterist reading of Matthew 24–25, relying primarily on the work of James Stuart Russell, Kenneth L. Gentry, and other notable preterist scholars.

I. The Historical and Literary Context of the Olivet Discourse

The discourse begins with Jesus’ prediction of the destruction of the temple: “Truly, I say to you, there will not be left here one stone upon another that will not be thrown down” (Matt 24:2, ESV). This startling declaration prompts the disciples to ask: “Tell us, when will these things be, and what will be the sign of your coming and of the end of the age?” (Matt 24:3). The preterist interpretation views these questions as pertaining not to the end of the world, but to the impending judgment on Jerusalem and the Jewish temple system.

James Stuart Russell, in The Parousia (1878), argues that the disciples’ inquiry was rooted in their understanding that the destruction of the temple would signal a cataclysmic change in the Jewish age (Russell, 1878, p. 68). He contends that Jesus’ response must be interpreted within this immediate historical expectation and that the “coming” of the Son of Man referred not to a physical return, but to a coming in judgment upon Jerusalem.

II. Time Indicators: “This Generation”

A critical component of the preterist argument centers on the time indicators within the text. Jesus explicitly states: “Truly, I say to you, this generation will not pass away until all these things take place” (Matt 24:34). This statement, according to Russell, forms the hermeneutical key to the entire discourse. He writes, “There is no ambiguity in the expression. 'This generation' means the people then living, the contemporary generation of Christ’s hearers” (Russell, 1878, p. 104).

Kenneth Gentry affirms this reading, asserting that any interpretation of the Olivet Discourse that fails to take the temporal proximity statements seriously “does violence to the integrity of Scripture” (Before Jerusalem Fell, 1989, p. 141). Indeed, the consistent New Testament usage of genea (generation) points to a time span of approximately forty years—the very period between Christ’s prophecy and the destruction of the temple in AD 70.

III. Apocalyptic Language and Jewish Symbolism

Another key element in understanding Matthew 24 lies in appreciating Jewish apocalyptic language. Much of the imagery employed by Jesus—darkened sun, falling stars, shaking of heavens (Matt 24:29)—is symbolic, drawn from Old Testament prophetic idioms. For instance, similar language is found in Isaiah’s description of Babylon’s fall (Isa 13:10) and Ezekiel’s oracle against Egypt (Ezek 32:7–8). These metaphors signify political and religious upheaval, not literal cosmic destruction.

Russell underscores this literary feature, arguing that to read such language literally is to misread its intended meaning. “The sun and moon are not physical orbs,” he explains, “but rulers and powers in the political or ecclesiastical world” (Russell, 1878, p. 125). Preterists thus view Matthew 24:29–31 as referring to the divine judgment upon the Jewish nation, culminating in the temple’s destruction.

IV. The Coming of the Son of Man

Matthew 24:30 declares, “Then will appear in heaven the sign of the Son of Man... and they will see the Son of Man coming on the clouds of heaven.” Many futurists identify this with the Second Coming. However, preterists interpret this “coming” in line with Daniel 7:13–14, not as Jesus’ return to earth, but as a heavenly enthronement and vindication following judgment.

As Russell points out, the Danielic imagery portrays the Son of Man coming to the Ancient of Days, not from heaven to earth. He writes: “It is a coming in the clouds of heaven to receive a kingdom, not a return to earth to establish one” (Russell, 1878, p. 162). Thus, the “coming” in Matthew 24 refers to Christ’s vindication through the destruction of Jerusalem and the temple, demonstrating that He was indeed enthroned as judge and king.

V. Matthew 25 and the Parables of Judgment

Critics of preterism often argue that Matthew 25, with its parables of the Ten Virgins, the Talents, and the Sheep and Goats, must refer to the final judgment. Yet a preterist reading sees these parables as continuations of the judgment theme inaugurated in Matthew 24. Each parable emphasizes readiness, accountability, and judgment—all pertinent themes in light of the impending catastrophe of AD 70.

Partial preterist, R.C. Sproul, affirms this trajectory: “The parables illustrate not the end of the world, but the crisis that was coming upon that generation” (The Last Days According to Jesus, 1998, p. 153). The division between faithful and unfaithful servants and the consequences that follow are representative of the judgment upon Israel and the transition to the kingdom community led by Christ and His apostles.

Conclusion

The preterist interpretation of the Olivet Discourse in Matthew 24–25 offers a coherent, textually grounded, and historically contextual reading of one of the most debated eschatological passages in the New Testament. By emphasizing the immediacy of Jesus’ warnings, the symbolic nature of apocalyptic imagery, and the historical fulfillment in the destruction of Jerusalem in AD 70, scholars like James Stuart Russell and Kenneth Gentry offer compelling evidence that “all these things” were indeed fulfilled within the generation to whom Jesus spoke. Such an interpretation not only vindicates the prophetic integrity of Jesus’ words but also reorients Christian eschatology toward the ongoing reality of Christ’s kingdom, inaugurated in judgment and consummated in redemptive victory.

Bibliography

Gentry, Kenneth L. Before Jerusalem Fell: Dating the Book of Revelation. Tyler, TX: Institute for Christian Economics, 1989.
Russell, James Stuart. The Parousia: A Critical Inquiry into the New Testament Doctrine of Our Lord's Second Coming. London: Daldy, Isbister & Co., 1878.
Sproul, R.C. The Last Days According to Jesus. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1998.
Wright, N.T. Jesus and the Victory of God. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996.
DeMar, Gary. Last Days Madness: Obsession of the Modern Church. Powder Springs, GA: American Vision, 1999.