Abstract
Jonathan Edwards’ Freedom of the Will (1754) is a theological and philosophical treatise that rigorously refutes Arminian soteriology by dismantling the philosophical foundation upon which it rests: the notion of libertarian free will. By defending a compatibilist account of human freedom, Edwards upholds the sovereignty of divine grace, the moral inability of the unregenerate will, and the necessity of efficacious regeneration. Central to his project is a detailed critique not only of Arminian theology but also of Enlightenment thinkers like John Locke, whose account of liberty Edwards reinterprets and ultimately repurposes. This essay explores Edwards’ theological concerns, philosophical arguments, and metaphysical commitments, demonstrating how Freedom of the Will represents a coherent and robust defense of monergism against the incursions of Arminian synergism.
I. Historical and Theological Context: Edwards Against the Arminian Drift
In early eighteenth-century New England, Reformed orthodoxy found itself under assault from a growing current of Arminian theology. Stemming from the legacy of Jacobus Arminius and popularized in American contexts by figures such as Charles Chauncy, Arminianism emphasized human responsibility, conditional election, and the resistibility of grace. This theological drift alarmed Edwards, who saw it not merely as a doctrinal error but as a threat to the very nature of the gospel.
In Freedom of the Will, Edwards sought to expose the underlying anthropological assumptions of Arminianism—namely, that humans possess a libertarian freedom of will, capable of making morally significant choices independent of divine causation. Edwards considered this notion both philosophically incoherent and theologically pernicious. His aim, therefore, was to establish that the will is not a self-determining power but is always governed by the greatest motive or strongest inclination at the moment of choice. With this, Edwards defended a vision of grace that is truly sovereign and effectual.
II. Edwards’ Compatibilist Definition of Freedom
Edwards begins by distinguishing between different senses of the term “freedom.” He defines the will simply as "that by which the soul either chooses or refuses" (Freedom of the Will, Part I, §1). He then asserts that true freedom consists not in indeterminacy or the capacity to choose contrary to inclination, but in the ability to act according to one’s own desires—what would later be called “volitional compatibilism.”
In this framework, an act is free so long as it arises from the internal motivations and character of the agent, even if those motivations are themselves determined. This redefinition strategically undermines the Arminian requirement of liberty of indifference—the idea that for a choice to be free, it must be undetermined and the agent must possess an equal power to choose A or not-A in a morally neutral fashion.
For Edwards, such a conception is unintelligible. He contends that the will is never in a state of perfect neutrality or suspended equilibrium. Rather, every volition is determined by the strongest motive at the time. In this way, Edwards reorients the debate away from metaphysical speculation and toward moral psychology: what matters is not metaphysical contingency but the alignment between desire and action.
III. The Impossibility of Libertarian Freedom and the Myth of a Neutral Will
One of the most critical sections of Freedom of the Will is Edwards’ devastating critique of libertarianism, especially the idea that the will can determine itself apart from any prior cause or motive. He famously writes:
“If the will determines itself, then the determination of the will must be the cause of the act of the will—which is absurd, for it makes the act its own cause.”
This self-determining will, Edwards argues, collapses into an infinite regress. If a volition determines a volition, then that act itself must have been determined by a prior volition, and so on. This not only leads to logical incoherence but also renders moral action inexplicable. By contrast, if actions flow necessarily from the character and motives of the person, they remain intelligible and morally accountable.
He also critiques the idea of equipoise or indifference in decision-making, where the will is imagined as suspended between choices with no prior inclination. Edwards claims that such neutrality would in fact destroy moral agency. If the will were truly indifferent, then every decision would be arbitrary, and no action could be traced to character or reason. Moral responsibility would be impossible.
Thus, Edwards exposes the libertarian notion of the “power of contrary choice” as both a psychological fiction and a metaphysical illusion. His conclusion is stark: freedom does not consist in contingency, but in the self-consistent operation of one’s nature under the governance of God’s providence.
IV. Moral Inability and the Necessity of Regenerating Grace
Edwards’ theological genius is most evident in his distinction between natural and moral ability. He concedes to the Arminians that humans possess natural faculties sufficient for obedience: reason, will, and bodily organs. However, he insists that fallen humans lack moral ability—the capacity to will spiritual good—because their hearts are enslaved to sin.
This moral inability, though voluntary, is nevertheless total. Edwards describes the unregenerate will as "entirely under the power of a disposition to evil." Since the will always follows the greatest inclination, and the sinful nature inclines away from God, no one can or will choose Christ apart from divine grace. This reinforces the Reformed doctrines of total depravity and irresistible grace: the sinner cannot come unless drawn, and once drawn, the regenerated soul will come freely.
In contrast, Arminianism claims that prevenient grace restores a libertarian freedom to all persons, enabling them to cooperate with God. Edwards rejects this as incoherent. If libertarian freedom is a false notion, then no amount of grace can make it real. Furthermore, to posit grace that merely enables but does not secure salvation is to return the decisive cause of salvation to the human will—a move Edwards sees as robbing God of His glory.
V. Edwards’ Engagement with John Locke
A fascinating and underappreciated feature of Freedom of the Will is Edwards’ engagement with John Locke, the preeminent Enlightenment philosopher of human understanding. Edwards had read Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding with admiration, yet found Locke’s analysis of liberty and volition lacking in theological and metaphysical rigor.
Locke had defined liberty as "the power to do or not to do" according to the determination of the will. For Locke, the will was not free; rather, the person was free when able to act in accordance with volition. Edwards agrees with Locke on this point but extends it in a deterministic direction Locke himself may not have embraced. For Edwards, liberty consists precisely in this ability to act as one wills—but since the will is governed by motive and inclination, and these are shaped by nature and circumstance (and ultimately by God), there is no room for libertarian autonomy.
Edwards critiques Locke’s failure to grapple with the causal chain that lies behind volition. While Locke isolates freedom to the realm of external action, Edwards insists that true moral accountability must reach deeper: to the origin of volitions themselves. Hence, he corrects what he sees as Locke’s superficial definition by arguing that even the choices we make are determined by antecedent factors outside our control—particularly the disposition of the heart.
In this way, Edwards is both a Lockean and a critic of Locke. He appropriates Locke’s distinction between freedom and will, but refines it into a theological anthropology that affirms divine sovereignty and human accountability in a way Locke’s empirical psychology could not sustain.
VI. The Soteriological Stakes: Monergism or Synergism
The philosophical debate over freedom and determinism is, for Edwards, not an abstract exercise but a theological necessity. At the heart of the dispute lies the question: Who saves the sinner—God alone, or God and man together?
Arminianism, with its libertarian anthropology, necessarily implies synergism: that salvation depends on the cooperation of the human will with grace. Edwards rejects this as a subtle form of works-righteousness. If faith is not a gift of sovereign grace but a self-generated response, then the glory of salvation is shared with the sinner. Edwards insists that such a view contradicts the Pauline doctrine of grace and empties the cross of its power.
In contrast, Edwards affirms monergism: that salvation is entirely a work of God from beginning to end. Regeneration precedes faith, and the faith that follows is the inevitable expression of a new heart. The will is not coerced but transformed, and thus acts freely in accordance with its renewed nature. This is the heart of Edwards’ theological vision: God glorified in the sovereign display of mercy, without any contribution from human merit.
VII. Conclusion: Edwards’ Legacy and the Enduring Debate
Jonathan Edwards’ Freedom of the Will remains one of the most formidable theological treatises in American history. By dismantling the philosophical underpinnings of Arminian soteriology—especially the incoherence of libertarian freedom—Edwards offers a vision of divine grace that is intellectually rigorous and spiritually profound. His compatibilist understanding of freedom, his distinction between moral and natural ability, and his engagement with Enlightenment philosophy all combine to form a coherent and compelling defense of Reformed orthodoxy.
Edwards' critique of Arminianism is not merely an academic exercise but a pastoral imperative. For Edwards, the glory of God and the hope of the sinner depend on a right understanding of grace. Any theology that elevates the autonomy of the will above the sovereignty of God compromises both.
In a modern theological context still divided on these issues, Freedom of the Will stands as a clarion call to uphold the majesty of God’s sovereign mercy and the futility of human striving apart from it.
Selected Bibliography
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Edwards, Jonathan. Freedom of the Will. Edited by Paul Ramsey. Yale University Press, 1957.
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Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Edited by Peter H. Nidditch. Oxford University Press, 1975.
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Marsden, George. Jonathan Edwards: A Life. Yale University Press, 2003.
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Helm, Paul. Jonathan Edwards on God and Creation. Oxford University Press, 2014.
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McClymond, Michael J., and Gerald R. McDermott. The Theology of Jonathan Edwards. Oxford University Press, 2012.
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Crisp, Oliver D. Jonathan Edwards on the Will: A Contemporary Exposition. T&T Clark, 2019.
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