Introduction

Christian theology has generally approached the problem of evil along two distinct lines. The Augustinian theodicy looks backward, locating the source of evil in the misuse of free will and explaining it as a privation of the good. By contrast, the Irenaean theodicy looks forward, interpreting evil as a necessary stage in the moral and spiritual development of humanity, a crucible for growth and eventual restoration. These two models—backward-looking and forward-looking—frame most later theological responses.

When examined through this lens, Augustine exemplifies the backward-looking approach, Calvin embodies a forward-looking providential approach closer to Irenaeus, and Jonathan Edwards radicalizes Calvin’s position by grounding evil itself in God’s eternal plan for the manifestation of His glory. This essay will explore their contributions and argue that universalism uniquely resolves the limitations of these “limitarian” theodicies by combining Augustine’s doctrine of privation with the restorative, developmental trajectory of Irenaeus.

I. Augustine: Evil as Privation and Backward Fall

Augustine (354–430) developed his theodicy in opposition to Manichaeism. Evil, he argued, is not a positive substance but a privation (privatio boni) of the good. In Confessions he writes:

“For evil has no positive nature; but the loss of good has received the name ‘evil.’”¹

In the Enchiridion he elaborates:

“For what is that which we call evil but the absence of good? In the bodies of animals, disease and wounds mean nothing but the absence of health… In the mind, when it departs from the light of wisdom, this is called vice… And thus it is that evil is nothing else than the privation of good.”²

For Augustine, evil originates in the misuse of creaturely freedom—the fall of angels and of humanity. This is a backward-looking theodicy, locating the tragedy of evil in a primal lapse. Evil is not part of God’s design but an accident permitted for the sake of freedom.

It is noteworthy that Augustine, influenced by Platonism, once entertained the idea of the soul’s preexistence. In On Free Choice of the Will he recalls:

“I myself once believed that souls sinned in another life, and for that reason were cast into bodies as into prisons.”³

Though later rejected, this speculation reveals the Platonic undertone of Augustine’s theodicy: evil as decline, descent, or turning away from the Good.

II. Calvin: Evil as Providential Instrumentality

John Calvin (1509–1564), inheriting Augustinian concerns, nonetheless represents a decisive move toward an Irenaean-style, forward-looking theodicy. For Calvin, evil is not accidental but woven into God’s decree, serving His higher purposes. In the Institutes he insists:

“Men do nothing save at the secret instigation of God, and do not discuss and deliberate on anything but what he has previously decreed with himself, and brings to pass by his secret direction.”⁴

Moreover, he asserts:

“The wicked are not only impelled by the hand of God, but are also compelled to obey it… whatever they have done, they have been the instruments of God’s will, and most admirably serve his righteous decree.”⁵

Evil thus becomes an instrument within providence. Pharaoh’s hardening, Judas’ betrayal, and Christ’s crucifixion are not deviations but the very means by which God’s glory is displayed. In this respect, Calvin is ironically closer to Irenaeus than to Augustine: evil is purposeful, not merely parasitic, a stage in the unfolding plan of redemption.

III. Edwards: Evil as the Stage for Divine Glory

Jonathan Edwards (1703–1758), the great American Calvinist, radicalized this forward-looking view. In Freedom of the Will he denied libertarian freedom and asserted divine determinism:

“God decrees all things, even all sins… God decreed every action of men, yea, every action of every man, and every circumstance of every action.”⁶

Evil, then, is not only foreseen but foreordained for a higher end. In History of the Work of Redemption, Edwards interprets the whole sweep of history as a unified divine plan, where even Satan’s rebellion serves God’s glory:

“Satan, in tempting man to sin, did that which was exceeding contrary to God; yet by it he did but fulfill God’s purpose, the purpose of the glory of his wisdom, holiness, power and grace.”⁷

This is consistent with his treatise The End for Which God Created the World:

“It is a proper and excellent thing for infinite glory to shine forth… Thus it is necessary, that God’s awful majesty, his authority and dreadful greatness, justice, and holiness should be manifested.”⁸

For Edwards, evil is indispensable: without it, God’s justice, mercy, and power could not be revealed. This is a theodicy not of privation but of instrumentality and necessity, aligning him strongly with the Irenaean forward-looking tradition, though in a distinctly Calvinist idiom.

IV. The Universalist Synthesis: Privation and Restoration

Each theodicy, however, suffers from limitations when held in isolation. Augustine’s backward-looking account preserves God’s innocence but risks rendering evil an inexplicable accident. Calvin and Edwards make evil meaningful but at the cost of divine complicity and a limited redemption in which countless creatures are eternally damned.

Universalism offers a synthesis that resolves these tensions.

From Augustine it adopts the recognition that evil is a privation, a tragic misuse of freedom, even conceivably a fall of preexistent souls. Evil is real and parasitic, not a positive creation.
From Irenaeus (and Calvin and Edwards) it takes the forward-looking vision of evil as the crucible of development and the means by which God’s glory is displayed. Suffering, temptation, and even sin are folded into God’s redemptive plan.
But beyond Calvin and Edwards, universalism rejects the limitation of redemption to the elect. The forward motion of history aims not at partial triumph but at the restoration of all things (Acts 3:21). God’s justice and mercy shine most brightly not in eternal division but in universal reconciliation: “that God may be all in all” (1 Cor 15:28).

Thus, universalism unites the Augustinian privation theodicy with the Irenaean restorative theodicy, showing evil to be both a fall from good and a stage toward the greater good of restoration.

Conclusion

There are essentially two paths of Christian theodicy: the Augustinian, which looks backward to the privation of good through free will, and the Irenaean, which looks forward to the divine purpose in suffering and evil. Augustine, Calvin, and Edwards illustrate these models in different ways: Augustine stressing the fall, Calvin stressing providential instrumentality, and Edwards highlighting evil as necessary for the manifestation of God’s glory. But only a universalist synthesis fully resolves their limitations, holding together Augustine’s account of evil as privation with Irenaeus’ vision of evil as restorative and developmental. In this way, evil is not an eternal blemish or selective tragedy but the crucible of God’s wisdom, ultimately transfigured in the universal restoration of all creation.

Footnotes

Augustine, Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), III.7.12. ↩
Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Love, trans. J.F. Shaw, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, vol. 3 (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887), ch. 11. ↩
Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will (De Libero Arbitrio), trans. Thomas Williams (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993), III.20. ↩
John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Henry Beveridge (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2008), I.xviii.1. ↩
Calvin, Institutes, I.xviii.2. ↩
Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will, in The Works of Jonathan Edwards, vol. 1, ed. Paul Ramsey (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), Part IV, Sec. IX. ↩
Jonathan Edwards, The History of the Work of Redemption, in The Works of Jonathan Edwards, vol. 9, ed. John F. Wilson (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), Part I, Period I, sec. 2. ↩
Jonathan Edwards, The End for Which God Created the World, in The Works of Jonathan Edwards, vol. 8, ed. Paul Ramsey (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), ch. 1. ↩