John Calvin’s View of the Civil Law and Principles for Determining Penalties
By William M. Brennan
Abstract
John Calvin’s theological vision extended beyond ecclesiastical matters into the realm of civil government and jurisprudence. In his Institutes of the Christian Religion, commentaries, and sermons, Calvin articulated a framework for civil law that sought to balance divine justice with practical governance. While upholding the moral law's enduring authority, Calvin rejected a rigid theonomic application of Mosaic civil statutes in favor of a principled, prudential approach rooted in equity, natural law, and the general equity of God’s law. This essay explores Calvin’s understanding of the civil law and his criteria for determining just penalties within a Christian commonwealth and evaluates his position in relation to modern theonomic thought.
I. Introduction
John Calvin (1509–1564), the Genevan reformer, was deeply invested in questions of political theology. Unlike the radical reformers who often withdrew from civic life, Calvin envisioned a godly polity where civil magistrates were ministers of God’s justice (Rom 13:4). Central to this vision was the appropriate use of civil law—not merely to maintain order but to reflect divine justice in a fallen world. Calvin’s approach to law was not merely exegetical but also philosophical, engaging questions of jurisprudence, penology, and moral theology.
II. Calvin’s Threefold Division of the Law
Like other Reformers, Calvin divided the Mosaic Law into three categories: moral, ceremonial, and civil. The moral law, summarized in the Ten Commandments, retained perpetual validity. The ceremonial law, typifying Christ, was abrogated with the coming of the New Covenant. The civil law, according to Calvin, governed the political life of Israel and was not binding on other nations per se, though it retained instructive value.
In Institutes 4.20.15, Calvin writes:
“The judicial laws given [to Israel]...related to a form of polity...Now inasmuch as that polity had its peculiar laws, these have nothing to do with us.”
Yet Calvin does not dismiss the civil law altogether. Rather, he affirms that its underlying principles, particularly the equity embedded within it, remain instructive for modern legislatures:
“What I have said will become plain if we attend, as we ought, to the purpose for which laws exist...namely, that the lives of men may be regulated according to the equity of natural justice.”
This “equity of natural justice” is crucial to Calvin’s jurisprudence. It allows for adaptation of Mosaic civil laws in accordance with natural law and cultural circumstance, while maintaining the moral principles they contain.
III. The Function of Civil Law
Calvin viewed the civil law as a means to uphold both tables of the moral law. The magistrate is a servant of God, not merely to punish crime but to promote virtue. Civil law must restrain wickedness, preserve peace, and reflect the justice of God. In this, Calvin stood in continuity with Augustine’s City of God, which emphasized the temporal city’s role in maintaining civic order while recognizing its fallenness.
In Institutes 4.20.9, Calvin affirms:
“It is the duty of the magistrate to prevent the true religion, which is contained in God’s law, from being with impunity openly outraged and polluted by public blasphemy.”
Thus, Calvin upheld the use of civil penalties for offenses against both divine and human law—provided they were administered with justice and proportion.
IV. Principles for Determining Penalties
Calvin did not advocate for a strict reproduction of Mosaic penalties. Instead, he emphasized the following principles for determining civil punishments:
-
General Equity: The enduring principle in a Mosaic statute is its equity, not its literal form. Calvin allowed for diverse penalties across cultures so long as they reflected the same underlying justice.
-
Natural Law: Calvin believed that all nations possess a natural sense of justice derived from general revelation. Therefore, laws must conform to what reason and conscience dictate as just.
-
Proportionality: Penalties must be proportionate to the offense. Calvin condemned cruelty and arbitrary severity, favoring punishments that reformed the offender and deterred others without violating humane standards.
-
Public Utility: Calvin stressed the good of society as a legitimate criterion in determining punishments. Law must serve the common good and not just retaliate.
-
Moral Gravity: Offenses against God (e.g., idolatry, blasphemy) and neighbor (e.g., murder, theft) deserve distinct levels of punishment based on their moral weight.
In his Commentary on Deuteronomy, Calvin writes:
“Although God appointed a definite punishment for every offense, yet in these punishments, as we shall see, there was always an analogy and proportion to the crime.”
V. Calvin’s Rejection of Theonomic Literalism
Although Calvin held that the magistrate should uphold the moral law, he distanced himself from a theonomic application of Mosaic civil statutes. He explicitly denied that every penalty given to Israel must be carried out in Christian polities:
“We must not think that nations today are bound to the civil polity of Moses, as though there were no room for diversity of laws.”
This divergence from theonomy does not entail moral relativism. Rather, it reflects Calvin’s conviction that divine justice may be contextualized prudently across nations and times without compromising moral absolutes.
VI. Critical Assessment: The Weakness of Calvin and the Strength of Theonomy
While Calvin’s approach to civil law offers a thoughtful and context-sensitive model, it reveals a significant theological and practical vulnerability—namely, his reliance on the conscience and natural reasoning of fallen man to discern and apply justice. In a postlapsarian world, where human judgment is corrupted by sin, it is precarious to place the weight of penology on the subjective sense of equity or the evolving standards of cultural norms. Calvin assumes that civil magistrates, guided by general revelation and conscience, can adequately approximate divine justice. However, Scripture repeatedly warns of the deceptiveness of the human heart (Jer. 17:9) and the futility of reason detached from revelation (Rom. 1:21–22).
In contrast, the theonomic tradition begins not with human conscience but with God’s own revealed standards of justice as found in the civil laws of Israel. Theonomists argue that these case laws are not arbitrary or culturally isolated, but reflect abiding principles grounded in the character of God. While modern application requires thoughtful exegesis and contextual adaptation, theonomy provides a blueprint for justice derived from the only infallible source—Scripture.
Importantly, contemporary theonomists such as Greg Bahnsen do not advocate for a wooden replication of Israel’s civil code. Rather, they uphold the abiding validity of its general equity and the moral authority of the penal structure unless explicitly revoked or altered by New Testament revelation. In doing so, they avoid the subjectivism and relativism that can accompany Calvin’s heavier reliance on prudential conscience. Thus, while Calvin seeks to avoid tyranny through flexibility, he may risk injustice through human fallibility. Theonomists, conversely, seek to safeguard justice by beginning with what God has already declared to be just.
VII. Conclusion
John Calvin's political theology presents a vision of civil law rooted in divine justice, moral order, and prudential governance. He refused to absolutize the Mosaic civil code, instead appealing to principles of equity, natural law, and the enduring moral authority of God's law. Yet his framework also reveals a critical weakness—its dependence on fallen human reason to formulate penalties apart from specific scriptural mandate. In contrast, theonomic thought offers a stronger foundation by rooting penology in the revealed justice of God, using the Mosaic civil law as a guide for modern application. While differences in hermeneutics and continuity remain, both Calvin and the theonomic tradition affirm the need for God-honoring justice in civil society. In an age increasingly untethered from moral absolutes, these traditions offer competing but complementary resources for reclaiming a biblically grounded vision of law and punishment.
References
-
Calvin, John. Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Henry Beveridge. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989.
-
Calvin, John. Commentaries on the Four Last Books of Moses, trans. Charles William Bingham. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1950.
-
Bahnsen, Greg L. Theonomy in Christian Ethics. Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing, 1977.
-
Witte, John Jr. Law and Protestantism: The Legal Teachings of the Lutheran Reformation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
-
VanDrunen, David. Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms: A Study in the Development of Reformed Social Thought. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010.
-
Rushdoony, Rousas J. The Institutes of Biblical Law. Nutley, NJ: Craig Press, 1973.
-
Frame, John M. The Doctrine of the Christian Life. Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 2008.
No comments:
Post a Comment