The Covenant Universalist: Origen’s Rejection of Transmigration in his Matthew Commentary: Authentic Theology or Posthumous Redaction?

Among the numerous theological innovations attributed to Origen of Alexandria (c. 184–c. 253 CE), his concept of the preexistence and transmigration of souls has remained one of the most controversial. In On First Principles (Peri Archon), Origen articulates a highly speculative metaphysical framework that appears to include the notion of souls moving between different embodiments over time—a view not dissimilar to the transmigration (metensomatosis) of Platonic tradition. However, later works attributed to Origen, particularly the Commentary on Matthew, seem to reject this doctrine explicitly. This essay argues that the views found in On First Principles reflect Origen’s authentic theological convictions, and that the apparent shift in his later writings may result not from Origen himself, but from the interpretive interventions and editorial modifications of later scholars, especially Rufinus of Aquileia and Jerome of Stridon.

In On First Principles, Origen presents a systematic theology grounded in the idea of rational souls (logika) preexisting their embodiment. These souls, according to Origen, fell away from the divine by misusing their free will and were subsequently assigned material bodies corresponding to the degree of their fall (Origen, De Principiis, I.6.2). The diversity of embodied states—angelic, human, or demonic—is thereby the result of moral and spiritual conditions rather than divine arbitrariness. This metaphysical framework leaves open the possibility of multiple incarnations or transitions between different states of being. While Origen never explicitly teaches reincarnation in the Pythagorean sense, his theory of the soul's progress and regression through various stages strongly implies a belief in some form of transmigration.

Origen’s theological context helps explain this perspective. As a philosopher-theologian steeped in Hellenistic thought, especially Platonism, Origen saw no contradiction in integrating pre-Christian philosophical ideas with Christian revelation. His emphasis on the moral purification and ascent of the soul aligns with broader Platonic traditions in which the soul's embodiment reflects its moral state. To Origen, the justice and mercy of God are most meaningfully expressed when souls are given multiple opportunities for correction, purification, and eventual restoration—a process that may span various lives or forms. This harmonizes with his well-known eschatological view of apokatastasis, the final restoration of all rational beings to their original unity with God.

In contrast, Origen's Commentary on Matthew contains passages that seemingly repudiate transmigration. When interpreting the question of whether John the Baptist is Elijah reincarnated (cf. Matt. 17:10–13), Origen reportedly states that the doctrine of reincarnation is “not according to the doctrine of the Church” (Commentarium in Matthaeum, XIII.1). Yet this rejection appears jarring when placed alongside the more speculative theology of On First Principles. How might one account for this discrepancy?

A strong case can be made that this contradiction results from redaction or reinterpretation by later scholars rather than a genuine shift in Origen’s thought. Most of On First Principles survives only through a Latin translation completed by Rufinus of Aquileia in 397 CE. Rufinus openly admitted to modifying Origen’s text in places where he believed heretical interpolations had corrupted the original. In his preface, Rufinus states his intent to revise passages that seemed inconsistent with the Church’s faith, particularly on matters like the eternity of the soul and the nature of divine punishment (Rufinus, Preface to De Principiis). It is entirely plausible, then, that Rufinus either removed or reshaped affirmations of transmigration in On First Principles, or, conversely, imposed rejections of the doctrine into other Origenian texts to align them more closely with emerging orthodoxy.

Likewise, Jerome, though initially an admirer of Origen, eventually became a harsh critic. While Jerome reportedly began his own Latin translation of On First Principles, it has not survived, and his later writings often portray Origen in a negative light. Jerome’s polemics contributed to the eventual condemnation of Origen’s teachings at the Fifth Ecumenical Council (553 CE), where doctrines such as the preexistence of souls and apokatastasis were anathematized. Given this history, the possibility that Jerome or his intellectual circle contributed to reshaping Origen’s legacy cannot be dismissed.

In conclusion, the doctrinal consistency of On First Principles, combined with Origen’s intellectual milieu and the theological coherence of transmigration within his broader cosmology, strongly suggest that this doctrine was an authentic part of his thought. The more orthodox-sounding rejections of this view in later texts are best understood as the result of editorial intervention or selective transmission by figures such as Rufinus or Jerome. As such, Origen should be read as a theologian whose speculative courage led him to entertain and articulate views that were, in his context, both theologically profound and philosophically rigorous—even if they were later deemed unorthodox by the institutional Church.

References

Origen. On First Principles (De Principiis). Trans. G. W. Butterworth. Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1973.
Origen. Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew (Commentarium in Matthaeum), Book XIII.1. In Origen’s Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew, trans. Ronald Heine. Oxford University Press, 2018.
Rufinus of Aquileia. Preface to De Principiis.
Crouzel, Henri. Origen. T&T Clark, 1989.
Clark, Elizabeth A. The Origenist Controversy: The Cultural Construction of an Early Christian Debate. Princeton University Press, 1992.
Trigg, Joseph W. Origen: The Bible and Philosophy in the Third Century Church. John Knox Press, 1998.